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I. INTRODUCTION

The present generation of free trade agreements (FTAs) suffers from a
lack of innovation. Political and other limitations have created barriers to
change. This path dependence, which finds its foundation in repetitive
language in U.S. agreements and the proliferation of those agreements,' has
two primary effects. First, it is prompting normative convergence in
international trade law as other states adopt principles repeatedly advanced
by the United States. Many of the FTAs negotiated in the last twenty years
by states around the globe track the U.S. model, at least in certain chapters.
Ultimately, and perhaps counterintuitively, the opposite may be true,
however. Going forward, convergence in norms may have a negative impact
on the development of international trade law in the next generation because
it is likely to lead to a disjointed and incoherent regime.
This Article demonstrates how and why the next generation of FTAs can
and should adopt greater innovations that will benefit the world's economies.
Focusing on the second, detrimental effect of the present path dependence, I
maintain that it is highly probable that the disparate use of boilerplate
language in FTAs will create fragmentation among interpretations as the
United States and other states engage in dispute settlement under those
various agreements. For one, boilerplate language could call into question
the parties' meeting of the minds on the language. More important, because
the agreements do not provide guidance on how or whether to consider
interpretations of their sibling agreements, it is unclear what weight each
dispute settlement panel would give to the interpretations of other panels.
Because no single court or tribunal decides disputes under FTAs, including
FTAs of a single country, the risk of divergent interpretations of shared terms
and references drawn from those divergent interpretations is high-or is it?
This Article examines how various elements of dispute design may dictate
outcomes in the trade law regime.
Analyzing the process and structures through which states make
instruments of international law-here, agreements governing trade and
regulatory areas ancillary to trade 2-is a foundational element of the study of
international law. In a system characterized by a lack of a legislative body,
the "how" of international law-making is of singular importance. I argue
that, here, the "how" has extensive troubling ramifications. In trade, the
1 See Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 YALE J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2018).
2 Twenty-first century trade agreements are also characterized
by their topical
expansiveness. See, e.g., Simon Lester, The Role of the InternationalTrade Regime in Global
Governance, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 209 (2011).
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influence of the U.S. congressional-executive trade law-making apparatus
reaches as far as the contours of the entire international trade law regime.
Given the alarming consequences previewed above, it may be time to rethink
this system.
This Article begins by looking at the present generation of FTAs,
beginning with the United States, and at the puzzling consistency across
those agreements. It then turns to FTAs around the world. I describe the
legal instruments that govern bilateral and plurilateral trade arrangements. I
show that large portions of their text are repeated across diverse trading
partners and different political leadership in the United States. The next
Section looks to the future and predicts unsettling challenges in interpretation
of these agreements. The Article then calls for urgent and crucial change. I
propose some possible revisions to the trade law-making process that take
proper account of the international trade regime and maximize the benefits of
both consistency and innovation.

II. THE PRESENT GENERATION OF U.S. TRADE AGREEMENTS
The roots of the present generation of U.S. FTAs stretch back to the days
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1.0.3 Substantively,
these agreements have many features in common, irrespective of their
diverse foreign representation. Procedurally, nearly all of these agreements
were negotiated first between the branches of the U.S. government through
the joint congressional-executive process known as fast track or trade
promotion authority (TPA). At the global level, the present generation of
international trade law instruments is characterized by the proliferation of
bilateral and regional agreements of like character, enlarged scope, and
common language. 4
Outside of the growth in the number of topics covered by these
agreements, one observes considerable consistency in the text of several of
3 Jagdish Bhagwati refers to a "second period of regionalism" that coincides with my use
of "generation."

JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM 31-47 (2008).

Sungjoon Cho refers to a wave of "Neo-Regionalism." Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World
Trade, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 39 (2006).
4 This development is motivated in no small part by the failure to complete the World
Trade Organization (WTO) rounds and the public backlash that dates back to WTO protests in
Seattle in 1999. See, e.g., Gregory Messenger, Anti-FragmentationStrategies: The Curious
Case of the EU and World Trade Law, EJIL: TALK (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/
anti-fragmentation-strategies-the-curious-case-of-the-eu-and-world-trade-law/ (describing how
"institutional deadlock at the WTO had led to a number of free trade agreements being
concluded globally"); Alex Tizon, Monday, Nov. 29, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 5, 1999), http://
community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=1 9991205&slug-2999667 (discussing
the public response to the WTO negotiations occurring in Seattle that week).
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the chapters that are repeated from agreement to agreement. Despite some
new elements to recent agreements, there are large sections where the
language remains the same as the last trade agreement negotiated by the
United States and each of the agreements negotiated before that one. In
other words, for some chapters, the first template has been the only template.
In prior and forthcoming work, I attribute this consistency to the
congressional-executive relationship unique to the United States.s The
additional intermediate scrutiny of larger agreements passed under TPA, as it
has evolved, has led to stagnation. Today, TPA exacerbates rather than
ameliorates the politicization of trade agreements.
The prospect for
improvements and creative additions to agreements still to come is
significantly tempered by this path dependence.
In fact, compared with most features of the international legal system, the
plurilateral trade law system is in the early stages of its evolution. The
proliferation of agreements, particularly bilateral and regional agreements is
not unique to the United States. The European Union recently concluded
trade agreement negotiations with Canada, Singapore, and Vietnam to add to
its twenty-seven agreements in force and is negotiating approximately ten
additional bilateral or multilateral agreements. 6 In the Asia-Pacific region,
the number of regional and bilateral FTAs has grown exponentially since the
conclusion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free
Trade Area of 1992. At that time, the region counted five such agreements
in force. 7 Today, the number totals 140 with another seventy-nine under
negotiation or awaiting entry into force.8 The People's Republic of China is
negotiating half a dozen bilateral FTAs at present to top off the sixteen
already in effect.9 India likewise is engaged in at least ten trade agreement
negotiations.io
The World Trade Organization (WTO) reports 303
agreements of this sort in force among its members as of March 29, 2018."
5 Claussen, supra note 1; Kathleen Claussen, Trading Spaces: The ChangingRole of the
Executive in U.S. Trade Lawmaking, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 345 (2017).
6 The State ofEU Trade, EUR. COMM'N (Aug. 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2012/june/tradoc 149622.pdf. There are twenty-two trade agreements between the EU and
individual countries, and five multilateral agreements covering multiple countries. See also
Five Models for Post-Brexit UK Trade, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/ne

ws/uk-politics- eu-referendum-36639261.

I have highlighted these statistics also in my

remarks at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting in April 2017.
Free Trade Agreements, ASIAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION CTR., Table 1 (2015), https://

aric.adb.org/fta.
8 Id.

9 Id. at Table 6.
1o Id.
1 Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures, WTO (2018), https://www.wto.org/eng
lish/tratop-e/region e/regface.htm (tracking the trade agreements currently in force).
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These statistics suggest that regional and bilateral FTAs are thriving.12
Regional and bilateral agreements have eclipsed the WTO in importance.1 3
The following Section examines agreements concluded by other states to
determine whether non-U.S. agreements also exhibit a significant degree of
consistency or, alternatively, customization. I then turn to the effect of U.S.
path dependence on international trade law more generally.
III. CONVERGENCE IN NORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT
A review of trade agreements from select European and Asian states
suggests that those states' agreements do not appear to suffer from path
dependence in the same way U.S. trade law-making suffers. In today's
domain of hundreds of agreements, it is challenging to trace the source of
each provision; that exercise is beyond the scope of this Article.14
Commentators have referred to the present generation as a "spaghetti
bowl"-a mass of regional or bilateral agreements concluded without
consideration for each other or their implications for investment, potentially
increasing both costs and regulation, and distorting conditions of competition
for traders.' 5 The concern is not only economic, but also legal: the "spaghetti
bowl" can garble the coherence of the trade law system.' 6
Contrary to this perception, this work indicates convergence within the
current "spaghetti bowl" rather than distortions in legal norms. Importantly,
in some cases, European and Asian trade agreements have adopted language
and chapter ideas from U.S. agreements. For example, the same labor
obligations in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) form part of the recently
concluded Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement
(CETA)." There are a number of possibilities as to how these obligations
both appeared in these respective texts. Without an inside view into the
negotiating room, one could argue that perhaps the TPP adopted Canada's
suggested language and Canada simply re-used it in its CETA negotiations or
Bhagwati calls it a "pandemic." BHAGWATI, supra note 3, at 15-47.
13 See, e.g., John Whalley, Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?, in THE
REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (Jeffrey A. Frankel ed., 1998) (TPP was an
intrinsic part of Obama's rebalancing strategy).
14 I elaborate on this study in forthcoming work. Kathleen Claussen, Boilerplate Treaties,
12

Working Paper (on file with author).

15 BAGWATI, supra note 3, at 61-71.
6 Moreover, fragmentation will not be limited to the normative inter-state context but is

likely to extend to the remedial channels for trade law claims, as well. Those domestic
remedies have costs for stakeholders not yet foreseen by the branches that indirectly promote

their proliferation.
17 See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art. 23.4, Can.-EU, entered into
provisionalforce Sept. 21, 2017 [hereinafter CETA].
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the same was true in the opposite order. Consistency across obligations
should be more efficient for Canada as a result. Research by political
scientists Todd Allee and Andrew Lugg indicates otherwise. They conclude
from their text-as-data analysis that the United States had a disproportionate
influence to the other negotiating parties in the TPP, suggesting that this
language came from the United States and then was re-used in other
agreements.
The TPP/CETA language also appears in earlier U.S.
agreements. Lending support to international political economy theories,
Allee and Lugg's study shows that the United States is setting the standards
in these agreements and extending its reach even to those agreements to
which it is not a party.19
It is not surprising that U.S.-initiated language appears in what I will call
"third party agreements" concluded by states that already have FTAs with
the United States. What is more surprising, however, is the appearance of
U.S.-initiated language in agreements between states neither of which shares
an FTA with the United States. For example, the same labor chapter
language from TPP appears also in Article 15.10 of the Sustainable
Development Chapter of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement.20 At the
time the European Union and Vietnam concluded their agreement, the United
States did not have a trade agreement with either country and yet the
language appeared in almost every U.S. agreement in force at the time. One
theory is that the European Union and Vietnam may have elected to adopt
this language with the express purpose of standardizing or harmonizing
across international trade and labor. Alternatively, they may have developed
the same language on their own. At the time of the agreement's conclusion,
the United States was negotiating with Vietnam under the TPP and Europe
was negotiating the CETA with Canada, so one cannot say conclusively that
the influence of the U.S. language led the parties to that language, but the
18 Todd Allee & Andrew Lugg, Who Wrote the Rules for the Trans-PacificPartnership?,
RES. & POL. 2 (2016).
19 This study and similar observations lend credence to Susan Strange's international
political economy literature of the late 1980s in which she argues that the entity or individual
that sets the rules maintains the greatest strength and, therefore, the United States remains in a
position of strength vis-A-vis other states through its control of international institutions. See
SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1988). President Obama employed this rhetoric in seeking passage of the TPP

saying that the United States cannot let China set the rules of the trade world and that TPP
would prevent that from happening. Barack Obama, Opinion, President Obama: The TPP
Would Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016),
https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-notchina-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/201 6/05/02/680540e4-Ofd0- 11 e6-93ae-50921721165dst
ormhtml? utmterm=.f464758e89ba.
The 2009 international trade objectives set by the EU Council reflect the same principles.
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language appeared first in U.S. agreements before any of the others came on
the scene. 2 1 A still better example comes from the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement (a less traditional trade agreement) which entered into force in
May 2014 and includes the same text for labor and environment as the TPP.22
In general, the influence of the repeated use of the same language in U.S.
agreements appears to have influenced at least the EU's trade agreements
such that the European Union has adopted the same language and now
incorporates it into its own trade agreements.
Borrowing language from other legislation or international instruments is
not a new phenomenon. Fortunately for legal development, there are no
plagiarism rules in treaty-making. Borrowing could have an impact on
interpretation, however. In the United States, courts will assume that
adoption of the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction
carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording. 23 Here,
there is more than "borrowing" at play. Rather, the proliferation of regional
and preferential trade agreements has led to a normative cascade in certain
areas.24
Taken together, the present generation of trade agreements exhibits signs
of convergence in respect of shared principles across agreements and across
25
geographic areas.
This convergence has legal resonance with two primary
effects for the innovation to standardization pathway described in the
previous Section. These effects are distinct in their policy and legal
implications.
21

Even the use of the term "agreement" for free trade pacts has proliferated as a result of

the U.S. influence.

22 The same language appears in a number of other agreements around the world including

the following: EU-Peru/Colombia FTA; EU-Singapore FTA; EU-Korea FTA; Korea-Peru
FTA; Korea-Turkey FTA; Korea-Australia FTA; Korea-New Zealand FTA; and, KoreaColombia FTA. See, e.g., EuR. COMM'N, Negotiations and Agreements (Apr. 10, 2018),
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/#partly-in-

place.
23 Willis v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 169 U.S. 295, 307 (1898). For a more recent
statement of the rules with respect to Congress re-using language, see Lorillard v. Pons:
"Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute
and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change." 434 U.S. 575, 580

(1978) (citations omitted).
24 On normative cascades, see Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink's seminal work on
InternationalNorm Dynamics andPolitical Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998).
25

At the global level, however, the same may not be true when considering also the WTO

regime. Cho maintains that the current generation faces fragmentation as a result of the

proliferation of regional agreements apart from the WTO. Cho, supra note 3, at 42 ("[T]he
'spaghetti bowl' of mushrooming mercantilist blocs under Neo-Regionalism . . stress the
global trade by raising new barriers to extra-bloc trade and disassociating a bloc from the rest
of the world due to its preferential nature.").
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The first effect of the normative convergence in U.S. and other trade
agreements is standard-setting across trade environments. The adoption of
labor and environmental standards generally in trade agreements has become
normal practice across polities.
Most trade agreements now include
provisions that seek to avoid a race to the bottom in both labor and
environment. According to the International Labour Organization, as of
December 2015, seventy-six agreements covering 135 economies include
labor provisions. Over eighty percent of agreements that came into force
since 2013 contain such provisions.26 As discussed above, TPP, CETA and
other EU agreements all contain labor obligations. In each agreement, the
parties are obligated to adopt and maintain labor laws that afford workers
certain fundamental, internationally recognized labor rights and to effectively
enforce those laws.2 7 The fact that these agreements share these provisions
across their disparate parties has a further modeling effect for states looking
to borrow from these and others in shaping new trade agreements. Including
provisions that powerful states have adopted may also have political capital.
In sum, trade policy has evolved to incorporate certain terms as a matter of
course.
The second effect of convergence toward the U.S. text is the law-creating
character of the repeated appearance of these provisions. Trade agreements,
while not typical law-making treaties,28 contribute to normative development
in their repetition. As the International Court of Justice has described in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, certain treaty provisions can be of a
"norm-creating character" such that they form the basis of a general rule of
law where certain other criteria are met. 2 9 From a social science perspective,
Wolfgang Alschner and Dimitriy Skougarevskiy, looking at bilateral
investment treaties, conclude that developed countries have more coherent
treaty networks than their developing counterparts, which, together with the
idea that those countries are both more prolific, lends credence to the

26 INT'L LABOUR ORG., ASSESSMENT OF LABOUR PROVISIONS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
ARRANGEMENTS 19 (2016).
27 The International Labour

Organization notes that the "great majority" of trade
agreements with labor provisions include language like this. Id. at 2.
28 For more on law-making treaties, see Catherine Brohlmann, Law-Making Treaties:Form

and Function in InternationalLaw, 74 NORDIc J. INT'L L. 383 (2005).
29

North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3

¶¶ 72-78

(Feb. 20) (requiring in particular evidence that states that adopted a course of action based on
the norm felt an obligation to do so). See also Anthony D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the
Generation by Treaty of Customary Rules of InternationalLaw, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 895
(1970) (arguing that the North Sea Continental Shelf test is based on intent: "If the treaty
manifests an intent to have a particular provision create customary law, that manifested intent
is controlling.").
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hypothesis that they contribute more to the development of custom.30 They
are not just more prolific or more consistent in the language to which they
agree; rather, they are both. It is too early to assert a general rule of law from
the common provisions in trade law, but their repetition constitutes state
practice and in that sense they add to what may develop as customary law.31
The facilitation of normative development through standardized language
also has an important ripple effect for other areas of law, particularly those
areas like labor and environment that do not benefit from enforceable
commitments elsewhere. For example, commitments in trade agreements
related to fundamental, internationally recognized worker rights in binding
agreements go a long way toward crystallizing international labor norms.
Regardless of multiple conventions on labor law, the International Labour
Organization's pronouncements on these issues do not have the same
strength as the statements in binding trade agreements given their status as
soft law.32 The widespread binding commitments across agreements to a set
of labor norms contribute to customary international labor law and a shared
understanding of internationally recognized labor rights.
The multidisciplinarity of trade agreements has a reverberating effect in these other

30 Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, The New Gold Standard? Empirically
Situating the TPP in the Investment Treaty Universe (Ctr. for Trade and Econ. Integration,

Working Paper N IHEIDCTEI2015-08, 2015). See also Lauge Poulsen, Bounded Rationality
and the Diffusion ofModern Investment Treaties, 58 INT'L STUDS.

Q.

1, 2 (2014) (concluding

that "developing countries often accepted the treaty template offered by their developed
country treaty partner without meaningful negotiation"). In contrast with trade agreements,
the United States has concluded most of its bilateral investment treaties with developing or

least-developed countries with asymmetric trading relationships with the United States.
UNITED STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/ 117402.
htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). Some have characterized the BIT system's power differential
as creating "contracts of adhesion" or "consumer protection" models, arguing that investment
treaties represent asymmetrical, standard form bargains between fundamentally unequal
parties (capital exporting states and capital importing states). Jose E. Alvarez, A BIT on

Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17, 26 (2010).
3 On the development of customary law or general principles through this process, Mark
Villiger takes issue with reading too much into texts. See MARK VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A STUDY OF THEIR INTERACTIONS AND INTERRELATIONS,
WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

(1985). In support of the proposition, see Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of
InternationalLaw, 47 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. I (1974); D'Amato, supra note 29, at 896.
32 See also David P. Vincent, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Environmental Savior or
Regulatory Carte Blanche?, 23 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 45 (2014) (describing how "outside of

large economic agreements such as the TPP, there is little hope for effective international
environmental law, putting more pressure on the negotiators of the TPP to succeed in

including effective environmental provisions. Although world leaders have signed over 500
international environmental agreements in the last fifty years, there has been little progress
toward environmental goals.").
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areas. One effect is that the U.S. Congress, with its considerable control over
the U.S. FTA text, is effectively creating international non-trade norms.
Transnational convergence contributes to and benefits from the
innovation to standardization pathway. Standardized or boilerplate language
contributes to the development of custom. States benefit from lower costs
and perhaps expertise. This view does not take into account the quality of
the norm, however, or the ease of implementation or application of the legal
text. Nor does it take account of the benefits of diversity in language among
agreements in a disparate system. As noted above, one argument for
bilateral and regional trade agreements is to use them as experimental
laboratories to accomplish goals that cannot be accomplished at the WTO.33
Advocates in favor of using agreements in this way promote experimentation
over convergence. What is clear is that as these agreements are applied and
disputed, the processes that lead to recycled language may need to be
reexamined.
IV. DIVERGENCE IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

The prospects for the next generation of agreements point to a fascinating
cluster of issues illustrative of larger developments in international law.
While the present generation exhibits convergence in the development of
new agreements, the next generation of trade agreements will be motivated
by the application and interpretation of those agreements in the years ahead.
This application and interpretation may lead to discursive divergence.
The United States has been a party to a state-to-state dispute under an
FTA other than the NAFTA just one time,34 and under the NAFTA only
three times, but the increase in the number of FTAs and of FTA size is
likely to prompt more dispute settlement in the near term. Even with the
consistency of language, the chance of dispute is high, particularly given that
this generation of agreements creates multiple enforceable commitments,
some of which can be initiated in a sense by non-state actors. In the last
three years, for example, the United States has received public
3 See, e.g., Nadia Gire, The Trans-Pacific PartnershipAgreement: A Revival in United
States Trade Policy Reform, 20 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 60 (2012) (commenting that the
effect of concluding TPP will be to push non-Asia/Pacific countries to recognize the
importance of completing the Doha Round of negotiations for WTO advancement).
In the Matter of Guatemala - Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a)
of the CAFTA-DR, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP. (2017), https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilater
al-and-regional-trade-agreements/guatemala-submission-under-cafta-dr.
3s For details on the three cases, see Decisions and Reports, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://
www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Decisions-and-Reports (last visited Mar.

19, 2018).
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communications advocating dispute settlement with Mexico, Honduras,
Peru, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic over labor issues.
At a minimum, the next generation will be characterized by what I call
"forum proliferation": a shift in interpretive power from treaty parties to a
plethora of ad hoc, independent tribunals unrestricted by precedent and
unsupervised by any superior authority. This shift draws attention to a
tension between states' authority to make law and their subsequent
delegation of law-making power. Notwithstanding that most provisions of
trade agreements are rule-like rather than standard-like, constraining the
interpreter's discretion, this generation of agreements provides little to no
guidance on how repeated language should be interpreted and particularly
how to interpret the interpretations that each independent tribunal develops.
Upon receipt of those interpretations, states may choose to reexamine their
repeated language and norms.
One difficulty tribunals are likely to face in the interpretation of these
agreements is a lack of guidance as to how to handle standard form language
analyzed in the prior Part. The customary international law rules on treaty
interpretation provide general guidance to arbitral tribunals in their analysis
of agreement language. These rules as reflected in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provide that a "treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." 6 Just
as in the common law contract doctrine,37 the VCLT presumes that the text is
the "authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; and that, in
consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the
meaning of the text." 38
International and domestic courts and tribunals have approached issues of
interpretation and intent inconsistently. This diversity has created a friction
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8
I.L.M. 679. It also directs that "there shall be taken into account, together with the context,"
practice in the application of the agreement "which establishes the agreement of the parties
rearding its interpretation" as well as any relevant rules of international law. Id.
Under standard canons of contract interpretation, courts first attempt to discern the intent
of the parties. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Boilerplate Versus Contract: Contract
as Statute, 104 MICH. L. Rev. 1129, 1145-46 (2006) ("[I]f actual intent is obscure, courts will
turn to the course of dealings and course of performance between the contracting parties in an
attempt to indirectly determine intent. Courts will sometimes use course of dealings or course
of performance between a set of parties to trump even explicit terms in the
contract.... Importantly, the process of contract interpretation flows from evidence specific
to the parties outward to more general and contextual sources of contract meaning." (citations
omitted)).
38 Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work on the Second Part of Its Seventeenth Session and

on Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, at 220 (1966).
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among interpretations that go beyond the plain text to illuminate intent and
those that seek to divine it from the text alone. Some adjudicators have
cautioned against going beyond the text in interpreting agreements: "The
starting point of all treaty-interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of
the text, not an independent investigation into the intention of the parties
from other sources (such as by reference to the travaux preparatoires,or any
This ordinary meaningpredilections based on presumed intention)." 39
focused approach has been adopted in many international arbitrations to
confirm that the supposed intentions of the parties should not be used to
override the explicit language of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), for
example, 40 or to override a textual framework,4 1 or be used as an independent
basis of interpretation.
In certain circumstances, however, the VCLT expressly permits an
interpreter to consult supplementary means including the preparatory work of
These
the treaty "and the circumstances of its conclusion.'A3
"circumstances" could refer to the "negotiating context."" Supplementary
means could include internal government negotiating documents, indications
regarding the model nature of the text, or even, other agreements with the
same text. At a minimum, such documents may provide insight into one
side's intended interpretation, but it may be difficult to decipher if a certain
view represents the parties' shared intention. An even greater challenge with
a model text is the dearth of evidence with respect to one party's intent to the
model's prescribed terms. As Will Moon has observed, model texts are

39 Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14,
Award, T 78 (Dec. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Wintershall v. Argentine Republic] ("Even before the

entry into force of the 1969 VCLT (in 1980), the Institute of International Law had adopted a
textual approach to treaty interpretation - le texte signd est, sauf de rares exceptions, la seule
et la plus rdcente expression de la volonti commune des parties.").

4 Fraport v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on the
Aplication for Annulment, ¶ 340 (Dec. 23, 2010).
Daimler Financial Services v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award,
T 164 (Aug. 22, 2012).
42 Wintershall v. Argentine Republic, supra note 39,

¶

88; Ping An Life Insurance Company

of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Limited v. Kingdom of
Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29, Award, ¶ 166 (Apr. 30, 2015).
43 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 36, art. 32.

4 This position is consistent with Hersch Lauterpacht's view that "in no circumstances
ought preparatory work to be excluded on the ground that the treaty is clear in itself. Nothing
is absolutely clear in itself." H. Lauterpacht, Some Observations on PreparatoryWork in the
Interpretationof Treaties, 48 HARV. L. REv. 549, 571 (1935). See generally Detlev F. Vagts,
Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the Supreme Court, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1989).
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"often devoid of distinctive terms that would limit the range of possible
meanings that may be ascribed."45
The issues surrounding one-sided template agreements have long
occupied scholars of contract law. The fact that one party brought to the
negotiation a standardized text calls into question whether certain potentially
material terms were "negotiated." The concept of unconscionability stands
out as one doctrine developed to address the inequities of the power
differential underlying many form contracts.4 6 At common law, superior
bargaining power alone rarely stands as a basis for interpreting a contract a
particular way. Disparities in power leading to imbalanced agreements that
favor one party are permitted by courts unless the disparities produce an
"unconscionable bargain."A A court may invalidate a contract or some of its
terms where one side demonstrates the bargain to be unconscionable such as
in a situation where one party's freedom of contract is exploited by a
stronger party that has control of the negotiations due to a weaker party's
ignorance, feebleness, unsophistication, or general naivet6.48 None of these
conditions is a good fit for modeling trade agreement negotiations. Even
where a state considering boilerplate language from a proposing state finds
limited room to maneuver to amend that language and may adopt provisions
not necessarily out of preference, the exploitative principle underlying the
unconscionability doctrine does not have application to the state-to-state
trade agreement negotiations or interpretations of today.49
Power differentials resulting from one side's advancement of a model and
inability to demur from the model are not an issue that international
interpreters have taken up. In the dispute settlement phase, trade agreement
45 William J. Moon, Essential Security Interests in InternationalInvestment Agreements, 15

J. INT'L ECON. L. 481, 489 (2012).

46 See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370

(1960); Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627, 632
(2002).
47 See generally Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath:
Dealingwith Power Differentialsin Negotiations, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2000).
48 See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 6 (4th ed.
1998) ("Most of contract law is premised upon a model consisting of two alert individuals,
mindful of their self-interest, hammering out an agreement by a process of hard bargaining.").
As noted in a comment in the Uniform Commercial Code, "[t]he principle is one of the
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power." U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 1998) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Fleming Cos. v. Thriftway Medford Lakes, Inc.,
913 F. Supp. 837 (D.N.J. 1995); Piantes v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass.
1995) (holding that unconscionability is not intended to address allocation of risk because of
superior bargaining power).

9 At least with standardized terms in contract law, uncertainty levels should be lower, but
that is again not the case for trade agreements as explained infra Section V.
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parties have equal stature toward an independent arbitral tribunal charged
with interpreting the relevant provision of their agreement. 0
The
aforementioned customary international law rules do not provide guidance
on the point of the power differential between the parties at the negotiation
stage."' Even if some terms are imported by one party without having been
discussed with the other parties to the agreement, it is unlikely a tribunal
would consider that fact to be part of the "context" as it is traditionally
understood in such a way that would inform an interpretation. U.S. courts
also interpret treaties as contracts between two or more rational parties at
arm's length. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that treaties are to be
interpreted "to carry out the apparent intention of the parties to secure
equality and reciprocity between them." 52 Thus, the power differential that
may have led to the appearance of certain terms in an agreement and which
could inform the parties' intent is not, under international law and contract
principles, a traditional factor in interpretation of those terms.
An adjudicator could seek guidance regarding the parties' intent from
documents internal to the state presenting the model. Here, too, international
and domestic courts and tribunals have demurred on the question of whether
internal governmental records regarding the agreement belonging to one
party could serve as sources of interpretation. Most adjudicators, however,
were not examining documents contemporaneous to the negotiations or
preceding them.53 In thinking about how to treat U.S. internal documents
Rachel Brewster comments that powerful states are advantaged in negotiations in
a way
they are not in dispute settlement. See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in
InternationalTrade Law, 92 VA. L. REv. 251, 251 (2006).
5 For more detail in respect of the power differential, see C. O'Neal Taylor, The U.S.
Ap roach to Regionalism: Recent Past and Future, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP L. 411 (2009).
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766-68 (1985); De Geofroy v.
Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890). The Court has not commented on the possibility that those
two elements would be at cross purposes. The Court's interpretation of a treaty normally is,
like a contract's interpretation, a matter of determining the parties' intent. Air France v. Saks,
470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985) (courts must give "the specific words of the treaty a meaning
consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties").
s3 Examining legislative statements at the time of implementation of the applicable
language in Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. UnitedStates, the investment tribunal commented:
Whether or not explanations given by a signatory government to its own
legislature in the course of ratification or implementation of a treaty can
constitute part of the travaux prdparatoiresof the treaty for the purposes of
its interpretation, they can certainly shed light on the purposes and
approaches taken to the treaty, and thus can evidence opiniojuris.
Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 111 (Oct. 11,
2002). Another investment tribunal faced with the same question also declined to answer the
question. HICEE B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-11, Partial
Award (May 23, 2011). The tribunal in CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic ofArgentina
referred to representations made to the legislature by one party's president with regards to the
50
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reflecting decision making within the Congress, John Norton Moore has
posited that an adjudicator would need to ask whether the materials were
available to all contracting parties, among other conditions.54 Thus, applying
the agreements of the current generation, dispute settlement tribunals
generally lack guidance from customary international law, the agreements
themselves, or other model sources to understand the parties' intent in trade
agreements resulting from templates.
A second interpretive challenge facing tribunals is whether the fact that
certain language is repeated in other agreements requires tribunals to take
account of other decisions interpreting the same language. Some trade
agreements include forum selection clauses to guide jurisdictional choices of
litigants but no U.S. trade agreement provides what I will call "interpretation
selection clauses" to guide the contours of interpretational jurisdiction for
decision makers, particularly with respect to the appearance of the same
terms elsewhere. Most U.S. trade agreements neglect to address how to treat
other trade jurisprudence at all. 5 The European Union's proposal for the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) suggested guidance

BIT and the meaning thereof CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/8, Objections to Jurisdiction (July 17, 2003). Likewise, in Quasar de
Valors v. Russia, an arbitrator referred to Spanish legislative history concerning the
ratification of the Spain-Russian Federation treaty and to a paper published by a member of
the Russian negotiating team on the relevant language as a basis for his interpretation. Quasar

de Valors SICCA S.A. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Separate Opinion
of Charles N. Brower, T 18 (Mar. 20, 2009). The Rompetrol v. Romania tribunal expressed
doubt as to how the respondent's treaty-making practice could be taken in itself as positive
confirmatory evidence of an intention to give the applicable treaty a certain meaning.

Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Objections on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, ¶ 108 (Apr. 18, 2008). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in the federal
courts "it is appropriate to look to extrinsic evidence of the negotiation history" in the
interpretation of certain congressionally approved agreements because such agreements are

both contract and statute. Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991).
54 John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution and the Rule of Law, 42 VA.
J. INT'L L. 163, 166 (2001).
ss Article 1.2.2 of the TPP provides for inconsistency with existing agreements, though a
party apparently can choose to seek to correct this problem informally or formally:
If a Party considers that a provision of this Agreement is inconsistent with a
provision of another agreement to which it and at least one other Party are
party, on request, the relevant Parties to the other agreement shall consult
with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. This paragraph is
without prejudice to a Party's rights and obligations under Chapter 28

(Dispute Settlement).
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) art. 1.2.2, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-agr
eements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (last visited Apr. 10,
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for interpreting and accommodating WTO jurisprudence. 5 6 The CETA
similarly directs tribunals as to how to consider WTO case law." The EUSingapore trade agreement includes some guidance -, but *is58 more limited.
Although the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA
(CAFTA-DR) does not provide parameters for citing other sources, in the
United States v. Guatemala case, both sides referred to WTO jurisprudence
and looked to the other CAFTA-DR case law for procedural guidance.
Even WTO-accommodating provisions can be subject to debate, however.60
These provisions do not offer guidance with respect to the decisions of other
FTA tribunals-guidance that may soon be needed.
Under current
conditions, a tribunal may or may not seek to reach consistent outcomes and
states have no way to predict how an individual tribunal will proceed in this
respect.
Similarly situated tribunals in the investment space have not expressly
addressed whether to take into account interpretations of other tribunals
confronted with the same language in other agreements. Where such an
interpretive issue has arisen, at least two investment tribunals have rejected
reliance on decisions from other similar-looking treaties. 6 1 At least two other
56 EU-US TTJP Negotiations, Textual Proposal on Dispute Settlement, EUR.
COMM'N 9

(2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153032.pdf (laying out in
Article 20, "Rules of interpretation," that "[t]he [arbitration] panel shall also take into account
relevant interpretations in reports of panels and the Appellate Body adopted by the WTO
Dis ute Settlement Body....
5
CETA, supra note 17.
58 Messenger calls it the "multilateral elephant in the room." Messenger, supra note 4.
s9 See In the Matter of Guatemala - Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article
16.2.1 (a) of the CAFTA-DR, supra note 34, Written Submissions of the United States and
Guatemala.
6o Simon Lester, CETA Dispute Settlement: Reference to WTO Jurisprudence,INT'L ECON.
L. & POL'Y BLOG (Aug. 15, 2014), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2014/08/cet adispute-settlement-reference-to-wto-jurisprudence.html ("How exactly should CETA panels
'take into account' WTO panel and Appellate Body interpretations? Cite to them, but feel
free to go their own way? Follow them as closely as possible? What if the customary rules of
interpretation lead the CETA panel to a different result than what the WTO panel/Appellate

Body found? And what happens when-don't be shocked-WTO panel and Appellate Body
interpretations are a bit unclear?").
61 When urged to follow the view adopted by another panel, the tribunal in Nations Energy
v. Panama noted that it had to resolve the dispute between the parties based on the clauses of

the BIT and the facts of that case without being bound by prior decisions in cases based on
different bilateral treaties whose provisions may be similar.

The tribunal commented that

other tribunals have adopted a different interpretation of the relevant clause. Nations Energy
Inc. v. Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/19, Award, ¶ 471 (Nov. 24, 2010). In deciding
whether to adopt an interpretation of another panel, the SGS v. Philippinestribunal found that

"there is no good reason for allowing the first tribunal in time to resolve issues for all later
tribunals." Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, T 97 (Jan. 29, 2004). In two other cases, arbitrators
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tribunals have found it appropriate to look to those decisions for guidance. 62
In the HICEE case, the claimant referred to two contemporaneous BITs and
argued that one of the two contained the same phrase in the same position in
the text. For that treaty, the claimant argued that the tribunal should take into
account explanatory notes on the treaty's submission to the Dutch Parliament
because, in the claimant's view, they would be meaningful to the tribunal's
interpretation of the same phrase in the agreement under consideration. 6 3
While the tribunal did not find value in that reference, a dissenting arbitrator
commented that "evidence of a State's interpretation of a term in treaties
with third States can be used as an interpretive aid."6
A third interpretive challenge brings us to the normative question faced
by dispute adjudicators in the trade and investment landscape: is consistency
in interpretation important as a principle of international decision making?
Are divergent decisions potentially harmful? Given the lack of rules or
hierarchical norms, we should expect tribunals to provide mixed answers.
Some tribunals are likely to seek to maintain consistency across agreements
in their interpretations of identical language, while others may take no regard
and instead adopt divergent interpretations as the natural consequence of
their application of the VCLT or in consideration of the arguments of the
parties.
The arbitrators that will soon fill the ranks of the trade dispute settlement
panels are likely to apply frameworks of thought from other areas of law,
including commercial law, human rights law, or investment law, in which
they work. In the same way, investment tribunals have referred to noninvestment case law for interpretive guidance, although I have criticized this

made the same point: "The integrity of this interpretative process must not be compromised by
the pronouncements of other arbitral tribunals in their interpretation of different treaties in
wholly unrelated factual and legal contexts. Other awards or decisions are no more than
illustrative of the implications of a standard form of treaty wording." Fraport,supra note 40,
Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Bernardo Cremades ¶ 7.5: "[G]reat caution is needed when
identifying cases as alike, especially . . when, moreover, the BITs often contain significant
differences despite their similarity." Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and
Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Separate
Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, ¶ 24 (July 30, 2010).
62 Daimler, supra note 41, T 52 ("[I]t is a fundamental principle of the rule of law that 'like
cases should be decided alike.' " (quoting Suez, supra note 61, ¶ 189)). The tribunal in
Quasar de Valors v. Russia noted that the it was not bound by other arbitral or international
judicial decisions; nevertheless, it commented that the other decisions go over much of the
same ground and it was natural to examine them in the light of the parties' arguments in that
case. Quasarde Valors, supranote 53, T 24.
6 HICEE B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2009-11, Partial Award, ¶ 143 (May
2342011).
Id. Dissenting Opinion of Charles Brower, ¶ 40.
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approach.65 Anthea Roberts additionally has observed that the dispute
settlement stage in the investment context has involved bringing in a number
of diverse "paradigms" or cognitive frameworks to the field, even if the
parties to those treaties may not have intended that to be the case and even
though this trend may have contributed to backlash toward investment
dispute settlement more generally. 6 6 From a private, commercial law
perspective, diverse results are commonplace and would likely not be seen as
troubling. Public international lawyers, on the other hand, may find diverse
interpretations of the same language problematic and may be inclined to seek
consistency in interpretations.
Proponents of public international law will find inconsistent
interpretations troubling because inconsistency compromises the idea that
trade law is predictable and stable and that it constitutes a legal system with
an ordering function.67 They argue that the trade regime needs a coherent,
uniform set of rules to create a clear expectation among governments and
stakeholders. Without such uniformity, those actors could be subject to
conflicting obligations or rights. 68 If arbitrators were to adopt a public
international law perspective, seeing themselves as engaged in institutionbuilding, operating within a trade law regime, they may be motivated to seek
to render consistent interpretations. 6 9 In the words of Martti Koskenniemi,
65 See generally Kathleen Claussen, The Casualty of Investor Protection in Times of
Economic Crisis, 118 YALE L.J. 1545 (2009).
66 See Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms:Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment
Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 45 (2013).
67 See, e.g., Stephan Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology
of
InternationalInvestment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 875 (2011). Writing of the investment law

regime, Schill observes that "[u]nlike in commercial arbitrations that are rooted in a domestic
legal system, the international law of investment treaties appeared too uniform to justify such

different outcomes." Id. at 890.
68 See YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 114, 117 (2003); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMs IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).

69 This view, that trade law works as a regime, is widely held. As the number of regional
trade agreements increases, and as dispute settlement becomes more frequent, these
agreements begin to take the shape of massive regulatory regimes. In the investment law
context, commentators have likewise raised concern about "conceptual coherence" across the
"regime" of international investment law, suggesting that divergent interpretations of similar
language resulting from the independent tribunal framework have undermined the system's
legitimacy and resulted in a decreased reliability of outcomes. Andrea K. Bjorklund & Sophie
Nappert, Beyond Fragmentation,in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 439

(Todd Weiler & Freya Baetens eds., 2011). See also Schill, supra note 67, at 890 ("While
these developments were a rather natural consequence of the applicable law being enshrined
in bilateral treaties and their interpretation and application by one-off arbitral tribunals, the

problem of inconsistencies developed into the most important single theme in the internal
discourse on investment law."). Whether characterized negatively (as "fragmentation"),
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"[t]reaty interpretation is diplomacy, and it is the business of diplomacy to
avoid or mitigate conflict." 7 0 Under this view, a regime involving the same
provisions with different dispute settlement is a zero sum game: divergent
interpretations of the same language make agreements more difficult to
implement because the lack of consistency makes dispute settlement
outcomes less predictable. The network benefit of having the same language
is thus self-defeating.
The resulting mix of divergence and consistency is problematic for states.
From one perspective, the United States and its trading partners ostensibly
intended to set up free-standing dispute settlement mechanisms through their
diverse regional trade agreements. In each instance, the parties should have
the opportunity to argue the interpretation of the agreement without having to
differentiate precedent from other agreements. Applying interpretations
from other tribunals in disputes between third states imposes on states that
did not argue those cases intentions and obligations to which they did not.
subscribe or have an opportunity to debate. At the same time, not knowing
whether a tribunal may seek consistency or may diverge will leave states
without any predictability in respect of its proforma obligations.
That a degree of homogeneity across trade agreements would exacerbate
fragmentation in the law is in some respects counter-intuitive. 7 It is nonobvious that it would be more problematic to have panels interpreting the
same language differently as compared to panels interpreting different
language differently. One counterargument is that it would be better to

positively (as "legal pluralism"), scientifically (as "functional differentiation") or neutrally (as
"specialization"), this phenomenon was once the subject of a major debate among
international lawyers, generally. On embracing fragmentation, see Steven Ratner, Regulatory
Takings in InstitutionalContext: Beyond the Fear of FragmentedInternationalLaw, 102 AM.

J. INT'L L. 475 (2008). As noted by Martti Koskenniemi in his ILC Report, "fragmentation" is
a very frequent topic of academic writing and conferences in the last two decades. See Martti

Koskienniemi (Finalized Report), Report of the Study Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n,
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, n.14, UN Doc. A/CN/4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006). Some
commentators have noted some convergence among the otherwise fragmented regime. See,
e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Convergence ofInternationalTrade and Investment Arbitration, 12
SANTA CLARA J. [NT'L L. 35 (2014). Koskienniemi comments that "fragmentation and

coherence are not aspects of the world but lie in the eye of the beholder." Koskienniemi,
supra note 69, ¶ 20. Today, some scholars have embraced the multiplicity of decisions as
providing a "rich tapestry" ofjurisprudence. Bjorklund & Nappert, supra note 69, at 479.
70 Koskienniemi, supra note 69, ¶ 37.
71 The focus of the academy has been on how fragmentation and conflict, rather than
consistency and uniformity, could be problematic. On conflict, see Christopher J. Borgen,
Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 573 (2005); PAUWELYN, supra note
68; and Jan B. Mus, Conflicts Between Treaties in InternationalLaw, 45 NETH. INT'L L. REV.

208 (1998).
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operate in a zone of similarity with diverse interpretations of uniform
commitments rather than to work with diverse interpretations of diverse
commitments. The experience of the investment regime suggests otherwise.
The investment regime demonstrates the difficulties of inconsistent
interpretations of the same language.
For example, litigants have
successfully challenged the appointment of arbitrators in investment cases
where those arbitrators were seen to be partial in an arbitration for not
adopting consistent interpretations, while other commentators have found
such challenges to be unfaithful to the basic principles of the regime-that
every investment treaty operates in its own right.72 The courts of medieval
England similarly developed multiple inconsistent interpretations of the same
language, but they had the Crown to sort out those discrepancies.
Ultimately, the question of consistency is up to the state.
A strong
procedural argument can be made that a state should prefer arguing from
zero than risk having to argue away bad de facto precedent. It may be
intellectually untidy but more reliable, nevertheless.
Andrea Bjorklund and Sophie Nappert point out that the challenges of
diverse outcomes may be rectified "through techniques of international
lawyers that have been used to deal with normative conflicts in the past."
These lawyers and decision makers may "cherry pick" and use other
strategies to drive the case law that argues for a precedential system when
convenient and against one when inconvenient to do otherwise. Some
tribunals may find, just as some U.S. courts have found with respect to form
contracts in markets of sophisticated parties,74 that the market will respond to
bad interpretations 7 5 and on that basis they may find it appropriate to rely on
past interpretations that have not been so addressed.76 Some panels will see
the value in consistency and strive to be consistent either out of a feeling of
confirmation or out of a commitment to uniform case law. Self-referencing
may be seen as a way to build legitimacy and confidence in the decisionmaking process. In short, the public international lawyer is likely to consider
that the plurilateral trade law field is soon to become a conceptual mess.
See Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. India, PCA Case No. 2013-09, Decision on Challenge,
(Sept. 30, 2013) and subsequent commentary.
72

¶ 64

Bjorklund & Nappert, supra note 69.

Choi & Gulati, supra note 37, at 1130 (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d
929, 947 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
74

7 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 37, at 1131 ("[I]f the market had had a problem with the
prior court interpretation, the market would have corrected the language." (citing Morgan

Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1541-42 (S.D.N.Y.
1983))).
76 This may be true despite that U.S. courts are not especially useful points of reference
given that there is no similar market response among international trade agreements.
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One thing is certain: to the extent states seek to remain in control of the
meaning of their trade agreements, additional work is required to provide the
necessary guidance to arbitrators. It remains to be seen whether states seek
to and are able to respond to undesirable arbitral pronouncements with a
recalibration of their own. In the current environment, change after dispute
settlement may be difficult. Unlike in dispute settlement under bilateral
investment treaties where a loss to a state may motivate both parties to effect
change in the interests of their respective investors, when a state loses in a
state-to-state dispute under a trade agreement, the other side may be less
willing to agree to a clarification. 17
V. A WAY FORWARD: SOME TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

While the future is not fully predictable, the central proposition remains
that the trade agreement regime may face both normative convergence and
discursive fragmentation.
Two moments for improvements present
themselves: the "front-end"-at the root of the problem where trade
agreements are made-or at the "back-end" in the dispute settlement phase.
On the front end, one possible solution is to update the domestic trade
lawmaking processes to better accommodate change. In the United States,
for example, lawmakers could reconsider the shared power engagement to
accommodate the political and popular realities of the twenty-first century.
The U.S. Congress and the U.S. executive should seek to develop a
pragmatic mechanism to replace the current system for designing U.S. trade
law instruments with one to which both branches can contribute with a
principled approach to standardization and innovation. Such a process may
go a long way to discontinuing the current path dependence in chapters that
would benefit from customization.7 8 Just as scientific principles ought to be
n Even if that were not the case, change may still not be forthcoming: in a study of
modifications made to standard contracts, Robert Scott and Mitu Gulati have found that most
lawyers did not take efforts to revise contract language even after it was shown to be a
litigation risk. MITu GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION 73-88 (2012). The early NAFTA cases are not good touchpoints for evaluating
whether the same will be true in the trade disputes context given that they were highly fact
specific challenges without an emphasis on any element of the legal language that was unique
to that agreement.
78 Hal Shapiro and Lael Brainard adroitly put it this way: "A more effective fast track
would require meaningful congressional input into negotiations, more selective application of
fast track by the president, and closer targeting of fast-track provisions to particular
agreements." Lael Brainard & Hal Shapiro, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as
Fast Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More than a Name Change, 35
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 43 (2003). Neither I nor they were the first to make suggested
changes to TPA. See also Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade
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modified to accommodate breakthroughs in science, procedural
accommodations are needed for the new generation of trade practice.
Recognizing the challenges to overcoming the path dependence on the
front-end, a more realistic solution or stop-gap may present itself on the
"back-end." On the back-end, or post-agreement side, the next generation of
trade agreements would benefit from changes to the way dispute settlement
is handled. What is needed is some meaningful guidance for arbitral
tribunals or a coordination mechanism. 7 9
One useful option may be for states to develop rules like in conflict of
laws to govern the relationship between different systems. Elaborating upon
the VCLT guidance with specific instructions from states as to how trade
should be governed would improve outcomes for states and allow them to
maintain control over their public commitments. In the absence of formal
rules, arbitrators could be encouraged by states in the course of litigation to
apply a variation of relational contract theory in their interpretations to better
accommodate ongoing relationships between disputing states and the
existence of a larger regime. Relational contract theory posits two broad
categories of contracts: discrete contracts and intertwined contracts. Discrete
contracts are short-term contracts requirig "a minimum of future
cooperation between the parties .... Everything is clearly defined and

presentiated."8 0 By comparison, intertwined contracts are intended for longterm relationships between the parties and a larger regime. They include
broader terms in need of regular interpretation. "Intertwined contracts view
the bargain as complex and dynamic, and as part of an interdependency
whose meaning may be influenced by context."8 1 In an intertwined contract,
the contracting parties view the "relation as an ongoing integration of
behavior which will grow and vary with events in a largely unforeseeable
future." 8 2 Nearly any inter-state agreement or contract will be necessarily

Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143 (1992); Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Trackfor
InternationalTrade Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J. 471 (1990).
7 See generally Messenger, supra note 4 (noting the chances that parties will use these
other fora instead of the WTO to resolve their disputes: "One wonders whether either side
would be comfortable with panels within the TTIP or CETA taking the lead from WTO
reorts that arose from other disputes . . . .").
Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors
Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 276 (1987).
81 Mark Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 76
TUL. L. REv. 843, 944 (2002).
82 Id. at 945. See also William J. Aceves, The Economic Analyis of InternationalLaw, 17
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 995, 1013-14. Relational contract theory views the contractual
relationship as dynamic, in contrast to classical contract law which views it as static.
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intertwined.83
Among this generation of trade agreements the relational elements extend
beyond the individual parties to a single agreement and arguably reach other
trading partners with agreements with similar terms in the larger regime the
generation has created. C.J. Mahoney offers that the project of relational
contract theorists has been "to construct distinct rules of interpretation that
are best suited to effectuate the intent of the parties in relational situations." 84
This approach would shift the focus from the traditional sources set out in the
VCLT to take into account the relationship between the parties and
potentially among similar agreements. Such a strategy could lessen pressure
on the negotiating language travaux to look to the future, though it could
make the interpretation process still more complex.
A second option would be to renegotiate existing agreements with clauses
that accommodate divergence or consistency and to ensure that future
agreements likewise provide guidance on what to make of decisions rendered
under other agreements. The New Zealand-Brunei Side Agreement to the
TPP is the only agreement of which I am aware that expressly provides for
how arbitrators should treat other decisions (saying other agreements with
the same language should be interpreted consistently). Apart from that,
commentators have questioned what the TPP means for the NAFTA and preexisting FTAs among the parties, for example, more generally.
Transparent travaux and guidance on the interrelationship between and
among agreements will be critical. An improved regime would involve a
singular dispute mechanism or guidance as to how to manage divergent
interpretations. An even better regime would accommodate customized
provisions such that dispute settlement tribunals would employ customary
rules of interpretation without seeking to accommodate different readings of
the text. Having recognized such problems in the investment context, states
have taken steps to rein in tribunals. As Roberts puts it, the United States has
"draft[ed] a new breed of investment treaties in which [it and other states]
spell out the extent and limits of their treaty obligations with greater
specificity."8 Parties should provide interpretative guidance to fill the gaps

83 Ethan Leib has usefully analyzed the theoretical underpinning of relational contract
theory in the context of consumer form contracts with lessons to be considered for the
application of relational analysis should it be applied to standard form provisions in trade
agreements. See Ethan Leib, What is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form Contract?, in

REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND

THE LYRICAL 259 (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell & William Whitford eds., 2013).
84 Craig Mahoney, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the
Interpretationof Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 874 (2007).
8 Roberts, supra note 66, at 79.
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or update the VCLT in this respect. Given the diversity of practice on the
question of whether to consider internal government documents or similar
information that would reflect the thinking and intent behind select language,
to the extent courts and tribunals engage in this practice, they will face
difficulty in seeking to do so for standardized agreement language that they
find to be ambiguous. Interpretations that draw from relational contract
theory, taking into account the larger relationship among the parties and the
regime in which the agreement is situated, could be an additional advantage
to navigating the nascent regime.
VI. CONCLUSION

In this adolescent regional trade law regime, the structural features of
negotiations and the substance of the resulting agreement are necessarily
intertwined. At least in the United States, this dynamic is necessarily
different from other types of international law-making. TPP is emblematic
of the way in which a process designed to prevent failure has only
exacerbated structural difficulties to the point of paralysis.
Dispute settlement may cause the United States and others to revisit the
copy-paste approach, however. Now is the time to re-consider the values
that motivate how we make our international trade agreements.

